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Abstract 
Tracing is said to be merely a process and separate from claiming. It is then characterised as a 
set of pure property identification rules which cannot vary from claim to claim. However, the 
development of tracing in equity relied heavily on the fiduciary obligation to support its rules. 
While many of tracing’s rules can be justified independently of the fiduciary obligation or 
rationalised as evidential presumptions, others cannot. This means it is impossible to detach 
the process from the claim. Furthermore, it would be undesirable to do so because it would 
reduce the flexibility of tracing. 
Introduction 
Tracing, according to the present conventional wisdom, is a process used to support a number 
of separate, mostly proprietary, claims. “[A] clear distinction must be drawn between the rules 
of following and tracing, which are essentially evidential in nature, and rules [of claiming] 
which determine substantive rights.”1 Any peculiarities of the claim should remain there and 
not fall in the rules of tracing. All tracing does is make the link – it identifies where the value 
is, whether it passes through a link between old property and its new substitute and to what 
extent. For example, if I spend £100 on a vase, tracing only says that the vase is subject to any 
claim that the £100 was. If I spend £50 of my money and £50 of someone else’s on the vase, 
the vase is subject to a proportionate claim. However, the nature of my wrongdoing – 
conversion, breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty or otherwise – does not affect this rule of 
attribution. 
This view of tracing was popularised by Lionel Smith2 and championed soon after by, inter 
alios, Lord Millett in the leading case of Foskett v McKeown.3 The central argument of this 
article is that this position (the “separation claim”) is ahistoric, false on the current law and 
moreover undesirable. 
                                                 
* Lecturer in Law, Newcastle University. This article has its roots in a paper I gave a the Modern Studies in 
Property Law symposium at Queens’ College, Cambridge in April 2017. I am grateful to Amy Goymour, Ben 
McFarlane and Charles Mitchell for their helpful comments. 
1 Glencore International AG v Metro Trading International Inc (No.2) [2001] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 103 at [180]. 
2 L. D. Smith, The Law of Tracing (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) (hereafter, “The Law of Tracing”). 
3 [2001] 1 A.C. 102. It is accepted or acknowledged in, e.g., L. Tucker, N. Le Poidevin and J. Brightwell, Lewin 
on Trusts, 19th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), para.41–006 (hereafter “Lewin”); D. Hayton, P. Matthews 
and C. Mitchell, Underhill and Hayton: Law of Trusts and Trustees, 19th edn (London: LexisNexis, 2016), 
para.90.3 (hereafter “Underhill”); J. McGhee, Snell’s Equity, 33rd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), 
para.30–051 (hereafter “Snell”). 
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The separation claim holds that tracing is property-based. Then, its rules are based in and 
justified with respect to property norms, such as pari passu apportionment of ownership of the 
substitute according to the proportions of ownership of the original. The alternative, which I 
argue is the case on the present law, is that tracing is obligation-based. Its rules were developed 
and justified with respect to the underlying claims, namely breach of trust and breach of 
fiduciary duty, and this brought in the principles of those claims. Obligation-based tracing rules 
certainly mimic a property basis of tracing in equity, but this is a corollary of the requirement 
for specific property in a trust or constructive trust. 
If the separation claim is correct, there must be a single set of tracing rules, presumptions 
and justifications that apply to every claim. That there are different rules at common law vis-
à-vis equity is mere historic artefact. The rules cannot rely on unique aspects of the fiduciary 
obligation or any other. They must rely on generalities such as status as innocent party or 
wrongdoer. But if the rules of tracing do not fit this template, tracing cannot truly be based in 
property and instead has aspects of obligation. I make out the argument by showing they do 
not fit. 
In doing so, I show how, from the eighteenth century through to the twenty-first, equity’s 
tracing rules developed with respect to the fiduciary obligation. Supporters of the property 
model of tracing argue that they can be rationalised as rules of evidence. Then, the argument 
goes, the transformation simply has not been completed but will be in time. However, many of 
the rules of tracing cannot be explained well under a property model, particularly the 
presumptions in Re Hallett’s Estate.4 Moreover, even recent cases, paradoxically including 
Foskett itself, have gone the other way to the separation claim, positively relying on the 
fiduciary obligation to develop rules of tracing. It is not possible to rationalise these cases’ 
rules under a property model of tracing. It is therefore impossible to detach tracing, the process, 
from the underlying claim or claims. 
I also illustrate how an obligation model of tracing offers increased flexibility in complex 
situations. While the separation claim is laudable in the simplicity it brings, this should not be 
at the expense of justice. 
The reasoning in many tracing cases is unsatisfactory. One often finds a mix of justifications 
and obiter dicta to a narrower ratio decidendi. Much of the time these dicta can be interpreted 
to fit either model of tracing. A cautious approach is therefore required. Rather than taking 
dicta explaining the nature of the liability at face value, I focus on outcomes and the issues, 
actual, elided or omitted, and ask if they fit only one model of tracing. Otherwise, if a case or 
rule can be rationalised as fitting either, given the contested nature of tracing, it cannot be said 
to point conclusively one way or the other. 
Models of Tracing 
Obligation: Fiduciary Account of Profits 
First, each model of tracing must be substantiated and its material characteristics extracted. 
Consider first the obligation model of tracing. It has long been noted that tracing is very similar 
to the remedy for breach of the no-profit rule (the obligation not to make an unauthorised profit 
                                                 
4 (1880) 13 Ch. D. 696. 
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from one’s fiduciary office).5 Hence I propose that it is rooted in the fiduciary obligation that 
imposes a constructive trust de novo over each substitution in response to breach of that 
obligation. This builds on the explanation, advanced by Lord Millett and Richard Nolan, that 
tracing is transaction-based. It is analogous to a trustee’s power of investment, buying and 
selling trust property6 and “[t]racing seeks to mimic, so far as possible, the due administration 
of the [trust] fund”.7 This explains the need for specific property and the concomitant rejection 
of swollen assets tracing where no direct link to the receipt is required, only that the recipient’s 
wealth is swollen by it.8 Transactions may be authorised or unauthorised. If an authorised 
transaction, the ordinary process of overreaching applies to transfer the trust interest to the 
substitute. If an unauthorised transaction, the same occurs by operation of law on the election 
of the beneficiary.9 That operation of law, I suggest, is the no-profit rule. 
This easy fluidity between original and substitute property relies on a characterisation of the 
proprietary characteristics of equitable interests behind a trust – as “equitable property” is more 
precisely defined – as rooted in obligation.10 This view has a long history. Equity acts, said 
Maitland, in personam.11 The opening paragraph in Underhill and Hayton: Law of Trusts and 
Trustees states: “A trust is an equitable fiduciary obligation, binding a person (called a trustee) 
to deal with property (called trust property) owned and controlled by him”.12 
Certainly, in terms of claims against the trustee this may be characterised an in personam 
right. Of course, equity began to enforce trust interests against third party transferees.13 Then, 
given this “transmitted fiduciary obligation”,14 equity acts in personam against all persons 
affected by notice of the trusts. The ability to follow the same property into the hands of another 
results. Tracing is more difficult but providing there is some rule of attribution, the substitute 
property is considered trust property. That rule is the no-profit rule. 
In order for this to work with non-fiduciary recipients, one must take the label “constructive 
trustee” seriously. Such recipients may well be constructive trustees, but they certainly do not 
owe a full range of trustees’ duties – their primary duty is simply to preserve and hand back 
the trust property. Mitchell and Watterson have detailed a number of additional duties owed by 
recipients of trust property that suggest there is something more in constructive trusteeship, 
once knowledge of the breach is acquired. These include discharging the duty to restore the 
property to a proper third party rather than the trustee if the trust obligations demand it (or the 
trustee is likely to breach the trust) and to recover it from an improper third party and liability 
                                                 
5 E.g. J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, A. E. Randall (ed.), 3rd English edn (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1920), p.529 § 1261 (hereafter “Story”). 
6 P. Millett, “Proprietary Restitution” in S. Degeling and J. Edelman (eds.), Equity in Commercial Law (Sydney: 
Lawbook Co, 2005), p.315. 
7 R. C. Nolan, “The Administration and Maladministration of Funds in Equity” in P. G. Turner (ed.), Equity and 
Administration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p.73. 
8 Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 A.C. 74. 
9 See D. Fox, “Overreaching” in P. Birks and A. Pretto (eds.), Breach of Trust (Oxford: Hart, 2002) for the fine 
details of the distinction. 
10 The detailed scholarship: R. C. Nolan, “Equitable Property” (2006) 122 L.Q.R. 232; B. McFarlane and R. 
Stevens, “The Nature of Equitable Property” (2010) 4 J. Eq. 32. 
11 F. W. Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures, J. Brunyate, A. H. Chaytor and W. J. Whittaker (eds.) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) (hereafter “Maitland”). 
12 Underhill, para.1.1. 
13 Maitland, p.12. 
14 John v Dodwell & Co Ltd [1918] A.C. 563 at 569. 
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for profits made from it.15 It is only a small stretch to say this is an attenuated form of the 
fiduciary obligation that permits a further, limited, account of profits claim against the 
constructive trustee in respect of the trust property received. Then, tracing can reach past the 
first substitution to remoter substitutions not made by an express trustee. 
Finally, consider how this model of tracing leads to election. Without this, the beneficiary 
would be entitled to claim both original and substitute, resulting in a true “geometric 
multiplication of the plaintiff’s property”.16 Election comes from the fact that, for an account 
of profits, credit must be given for any property put in to realise the profit. On the facts of a 
tracing claim, that is the original property. The beneficiary can follow the original property and 
forgo the tracing claim. Alternatively, she may elect to take the tracing claim, but must give 
credit for the original property used to obtain the substitute. 
This explains why, at least functionally, a tracing claim is proprietary and not just personal. 
Following, leading to a pure proprietary claim (i.e. over the original property) can be justified 
on the basis that the recipient does not have title to someone else’s property and hence the true 
owner may take it back. But the same is not true of tracing, which is a restitutionary proprietary 
claim because it yields substantially new and different rights over different property.17 There 
is no inherent reason why that claim should not be merely personal and limited to the original 
value. The account of profits rationale explains why it is not. It is the standard remedy for 
fiduciary wrongdoing, where the principal is given more powerful remedies on account of her 
vulnerable position. 
Property: Tracing Value In Rem 
The broad difficulty with this is that a right enforceable against an indeterminate class of people 
looks very much like a proprietary one, which leads to the argument that tracing is property-
based. Consider the characteristics of that model now. 
As Oakley and Televantos have shown in detailed scholarship, equity once permitted tracing 
by the legal owner of property not subject to a trust.18 Televantos’ argument is that tracing was 
considered an in rem process for much of the eighteenth century and until the end of Lord 
Eldon LC’s retirement in 1827. Tracing simply assisted a claim over property based on title. 
The owner had a better title than the recipient and that justified the claim. The term “fiduciary” 
narrowed over this time to mean only the duty of loyalty, where previously non-fiduciaries 
such as bailees and factors had a “fiduciary character” such that tracing and related remedies 
could be brought against them in equity.19 Equity acted in its auxiliary jurisdiction to support 
a common law claim, but otherwise followed the law20 and thus permitted legal owners to trace 
property through a chain of substitutions until that property or its substitute became 
“indistinguishable”, including when it was mixed. It was not until the later nineteenth century 
that there was a considerable inflow of the personal rules of fiduciary law (in the sense of the 
                                                 
15 C. Mitchell and S. Watterson, “Remedies for Knowing Receipt” in C. Mitchell (ed.), Constructive and Resulting 
Trusts (Oxford: Hart, 2010), p.132. 
16 P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), p.394. 
17 C. Rotherham, Proprietary Remedies in Context: A Study in the Judicial Redistribution of Property Rights 
(Oxford: Hart, 2002), p.96. 
18 A. J. Oakley, “The Prerequisites of an Equitable Tracing Claim” (1975) 28 C.L.P. 64, 65 at fn.11; A. Televantos, 
“Losing the Fiduciary Requirement for Equitable Tracing Claims” (2017) 133 L.Q.R. 492. 
19 A. Televantos, “Losing the Fiduciary Requirement for Equitable Tracing Claims” (2017) 133 L.Q.R. 492, 503. 
20 A. Televantos, “Losing the Fiduciary Requirement for Equitable Tracing Claims” (2017) 133 L.Q.R. 492, 508, 
514. 
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duty of loyalty). For Televantos, this was the “unprincipled mixing of the personal and 
proprietary aspects of fiduciary law and trusteeship”.21 
This in rem or property model of tracing is attractively simple. Indeed, it is the new 
orthodoxy that we trace value. The value that was in the £100 is now in the vase. The strongest 
argument that this is the operative model, if that model is not obligation, is from the acceptance 
of backwards tracing. This is where substitute is obtained before the original property is parted 
with, for example if I buy a car on credit and then pay my creditor with trust money. 
Moreover, in Federal Republic of Brazil v Durant International Corporation, where the 
Privy Council accepted backwards tracing, it expressly adopted the tracing value justification: 
the “court is concerned with tracing the value inherent in a trust asset … [it] should concentrate 
on the substance of the transaction and not the form.”22 Such a claim was also permitted, earlier, 
in Boscawan v Bajwa23 and Relfo Ltd v Varsani. In the latter case, Arden LJ held that the 
ordering was not important if the transferor “acted on the basis that he would receive 
reimbursement for the monies he transferred out of the trust funds”.24 This is an appeal to the 
intention of the exchanger in determining a tracing link. In Durant International, the condition 
was phrased differently. In order to trace, it is necessary to: 
establish a co-ordination between the depletion of the trust fund and the acquisition of 
the asset …  such as to warrant the court attributing the value of the interest acquired 
to the misuse of the trust fund.25 
This is, it is submitted, merely an implicit appeal to intention. The testimony of such fraudsters 
is likely to be worthless and the inference drawn by establishing a coordination is clearly that 
the coordination was intended. It is just a practical wrapper for Arden LJ’s theoretical enquiry. 
The view that we trace value has been analysed in great detail by Cutts. Her most pertinent 
point is that changes in value across transactions make this unconvincing. If a trustee 
misappropriates £10 and buys a bottle of wine worth £100, this can be traced into. However, 
one is not making a connection through the value but through the transaction because the value 
changes.26 Moreover, the content of the transaction cannot be established unless one takes into 
account the intentions of the exchanger and other transacting party. Ultimately, then, the road 
beginning at tracing value leads to intention and a transactional model of tracing. I go only a 
little further: that transactional model is the obligation model. 
Reception of the Fiduciary Obligation 
The particular model of tracing adopted determines its rules and vice versa. It is therefore time 
to look at how tracing actually developed in the cases and see which model fits best. One must 
be astute as to the matters raised thus far: the fiduciary no-profit principle, the idea of tracing 
value and the role of intention. It turns out that two circumstances are very difficult to 
rationalise under a property basis: (i) how fault affects the tracing rules; and (ii) where not 
                                                 
21 A. Televantos, “Losing the Fiduciary Requirement for Equitable Tracing Claims” (2017) 133 L.Q.R. 492, 515. 
22 [2015] UKPC 35; [2016] A.C. 297 at [32]. 
23 [1996] W.L.R. 328. 
24 [2014] EWCA Civ 360; [2015] 1 B.C.L.C. 14 at [63]. 
25 [2015] UKPC 35; [2016] A.C. 297 at [40]. 
26 T. Cutts, “Tracing, Value and Transactions” (2016) 79 M.L.R. 381, 395. 
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merely an evidential gap, but positive evidence against a connection, is disregarded. In both 
circumstances the rules follow from and are justified by the fiduciary obligation.  
Around the Eighteenth Century 
As Oakley notes, the earlier cases were rationalised in the second half of the seventeenth 
century as instances of the doctrine of notice.27 Innocent donees and those other than bona fide 
purchasers were subject to the equitable interest in the property, which justifies following and 
tracing. However, if one examines the contemporary treatises, one sees that in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries the issues that exercised the courts suggest things were not so simple. 
In the early eighteenth century it was thought that it was only possible to trace into property 
exchanged in pursuance of the trust or fiduciary relationship.28 While the cases overlap and 
there is no single case cutting off this restriction, it only became established that tracing was 
possible where the trustee converted trust property in “abuse” of trust by the start of the 
nineteenth century.29 This suggests that tracing was very much seen as a function of trust 
management and dependent on the particular obligation breached, not something rooted in an 
enduring or transmissible property right. 
Knowing receipt emerged in the eighteenth century and continued to develop in the 
nineteenth. Here, recipients with notice of the breach of trust were treated as if trustees and 
following became possible, as did tracing into substitute property where the third party was 
responsible for the exchange.30 These cases also see tracing as based on trustees’ obligations. 
Nineteenth Century 
Given its reception into tracing, the background of the trust and fiduciary obligation is 
important context. The jurisprudence of Lord Eldon (1801–1806; 1807–1827) settled and 
hardened the fiduciary obligation. Nonetheless, his influence on tracing was indirect. Of the 
leading tracing cases, only Lupton v White31 and Lord Chedworth v Edwards32 were decided 
by him. The former holds that a beneficiary can trace into all parts of a physical mixture save 
for what the trustee can show is his own, i.e. a reverse burden of proof applies. The latter is an 
example of it being inferred from the long passage of time that the remaining money in a bank 
account was not trust money. Nonetheless, despite the appeal to the fiduciary status of the 
defendants, these presumptions can easily be characterised as evidential. Indeed, in Lupton v 
White, Lord Eldon cited Armory v Delamirie as an instance of the principle upon which he 
decided that case:33 The defendant who creates the evidential difficulty will find it resolved 
against him. This principle is not especially fiduciary and the defendant in Armory v Delamirie, 
a shopkeeper, was most certainly not a fiduciary. 
Many no-profit cases followed Lord Eldon’s retirement, where the defaulting fiduciary’s 
profits were disgorged to the principal. In Fawcett v Whitehouse, a partner who took a lease 
                                                 
27 A. J. Oakley, “The Prerequisites of an Equitable Tracing Claim” (1975) 28 C.L.P. 64, 65. 
28 T. Lewin and F. A. Lewin, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Trusts, 6th edn (London: Maxwell & Son, 1875), 
p.730 (hereafter “Lewin 6th edn”); G. Jeremy, A Treatise of the Equity Jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery 
(London: Clarke, 1828), p.87. 
29 Lewin 6th edn, 730. 
30 Story, p.528 § 1258 et seq; C. Harpum, “The Stranger as Constructive Trustee: Part 2” (1986) 102 L.Q.R. 267. 
31 (1808) 15 Ves. Jun. 432; 33 E.R. 817 
32 (1802) 8 Ves. Jun. 46; 32 E.R. 268. 
33 (1722) 1 Str. 505; 93 E.R. 664: Lupton v White (1808) 15 Ves. Jun. 432 at 435; 33 E.R. 817 at 818. 
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for himself rather than for his partnership held it for them on trust. Lord Lyndhurst gave a 
particular explanation: 
[H]e was bound to obtain the best terms possible for the intended partnership … and 
that all he did obtain will be considered as if he had done his duty and had actually 
received the £12,000 for the new partnership[.]34 
There are many similar dicta in other cases.35 This led to the “good man theory”, a 
rationalisation of how equity treated fiduciaries. It is irrebuttably presumed that his actions are 
done in pursuance of, not against, the trust, therefore the profits wrongly obtained must be 
handed over to the beneficiaries.36 
The good man theory is clearly a fiction, and similar to the idea that the claimant waives the 
tort and can thus claim the gain instead of compensation, which has been rejected at the highest 
level.37 Nonetheless, the good man theory is functionally correct and, as shall be seen, useful 
to determine the breadth of the obligations. Particularly, it says that the obligations of 
fiduciaries are such that the law goes much further than the evidential presumption in Armory 
v Delamirie. It explains why there was acceptance of tracing into property substituted in 
“abuse” of trust as well as in pursuance of the trust – the trustee was treated as though he was 
acting for his beneficiary. The good man theory explains how the remedy does not merely jump 
an evidential gap; it goes beyond what is possible on the evidence. Since the defaulting 
fiduciary is not really a good man and is positively acting against his principal to make profit 
for himself, the presumption is irrebuttable – a rule of law – and most certainly not evidential. 
It disregards this intention. 
Subordination and Mixtures 
One significant problem remained in the early nineteenth century. Tracing was possible 
through physical mixtures, but not mixtures of intangibles such as money. By this what is 
meant is mixed substitutions where multiple inputs go into one or more outputs. The tracing 
value rationalisation came later, and the old basis of tracing was that changes in form do not 
matter requires the property to have an identifiable subject matter, which disappears upon 
mixing.38 Consider how this problem was solved using the fiduciary obligation, and how the 
solution cannot be rationalised into a property model of tracing that characterises the relevant 
rules as evidential presumptions. 
The first successful case of tracing into a mixed intangible was Pennell v Deffell, a claim 
for trust money put into a bank account and mixed with other monies.39 The Court of Appeal 
in Chancery held that tracing was possible and the rule in Clayton’s Case40 applied, meaning 
the first sums paid out were attributable to the first sums paid in. This is not a rule of 
                                                 
34 (1829) 1 Russ. & M. 132 at 149; 39 E.R. 51 at 57. 
35 Phayre v Peree (1815) 3 Dow. 116 at 128; 3 E.R. 1008 at 1012; Morison v Thompson (1874) 9 Q.B. 480 at 483; 
Mathias v Mathias (1858) 3 Sm. & G. 552 at 563; 65 E.R. 777 at 781; Sugden v Crossland (1856) 3 S. & G. 192 
at 194; 65 E.R. 620 at 621. 
36 Sir P. Millett, “Bribes and Secret Commissions” [1994] R.L.R. 7, 20; Story, p.568 § 1211. 
37 United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] A.C. 1. 
38 Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M. & S. 562 at 575; 105 ER 721 at 726. 
39 4 De G.M. & G. 372, 43 E.R. 551. 
40 (1816) 1 Mer. 572; 35 E.R. 781. 
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subordination. The possibility of tracing into mixtures of money was first mooted in Frith v 
Cartland, where Page-Wood VC opined, obiter dictum: 
If a man has £1000 of his own in a box on one side, and £1000 of trust property in the 
same box on the other side, and then takes out £500 and applies it for his own 
purposes, the Court will not allow him to say that that money was taken from the trust 
fund.41 
Page-Wood VC goes too far by modern standards. Because the monies are separated he 
suggests in effect swollen assets tracing, later rejected emphatically in Re Goldcorp.42 
Nonetheless, he thought the good man theory should apply. 
Consider now Re Hallett’s Estate. The problem was that the trustee Hallett, who had mixed 
trust money with his own money in his account, drew out some money then dissipated it. The 
remaining money was enough to satisfy the trust claims, but not the trust claims and the claims 
of Hallett’s creditors. The beneficiaries wished to trace into the remaining monies, but an 
application of the rule in Clayton’s Case would have lead them to the earlier withdrawals 
whereupon the claim would be defeated as the monies has been dissipated.. 
Sir George Jessel MR advanced two bases as to why Hallett’s fiduciary obligations 
permitted this. The first basis was his own, the “notional charge theory”. The trust money in 
the account was considered charged, and adding more money to the account simply meant the 
whole was charged to the value of the trust money.43 After a withdrawal, a beneficiary could 
simply rely on the charge on what was left. It is notable that Jessel MR expressly said that the 
claimant is entitled to a “charge” after mixing in contradistinction to the position without 
mixing where the claimant would also be entitled to take the property itself.44 This had been 
taken to mean that the claimant is limited to a lien after tracing through mixed substitutions.45 
It is not clear from the relevant passages where the charge comes from, but context is 
provided later. In the second basis, Jessel MR relied on good man reasoning. He stated that 
“[t]he guiding principle is, that a trustee cannot assert a title of his own to trust property.”46 He 
quoted the passage reproduced from Frith v Cartland above and adopted the reasoning: the 
defendant “could not be allowed to say that the £284 deposited … was his own”.47 Yet this 
basis would not restrict claimants to a lien. The logical consequence of the good man reasoning 
is that what is left in the account is owned in equity by the beneficiary to the value of the 
transfer. Jessel MR’s view of the good man theory was therefore that it had this inherent 
limitation. It permits presuming against the fiduciary such that the most favourable actions are 
attributable to investment of the trust monies, but because of the mixing, one cannot access 
increases in value and is only given priority over other creditors. This was, apparently, the quid 
pro quo for the severity of the remedy. 
Re Oatway came two decades later. In a similar mixing scenario, the trustee was presumed 
to draw out trust money first. This meant that it could be traced into profitable investments 
upon which a charge was declared, the remainder of the account having been dissipated.48 
                                                 
41 (1865) 2 Hem. & M. 417 at 422; 71 E.R. 525 at 527. 
42 [1995] 1 A.C. 74. 
43 (1880) 13 Ch. D. 696 at 711. 
44 (1880) 13 Ch. D. 696 at 709. 
45 Foskett [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 131. 
46 Re Hallett (1880) 13 Ch. D. 696 at 719. 
47 (1880) 13 Ch. D. 696 at 720. 
48 [1903] 2 Ch. 356. 
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Joyce J took note of the decision in Re Hallett and used the good man theory to justify the 
decision. The logical outcome of the good man reasoning in Re Hallett and the outcomes of 
both Re Hallett and Re Oatway is of course that the beneficiary can “cherry-pick” from the 
transactions a trustee makes to her best advantage. 
The combination of Re Hallett and Re Oatway leaves other questions to be answered. First, 
are they evidential presumptions or can they be better rationalised as evidential presumptions 
because they are based on a fiction? Second, what are the lasting effects of the notional charge 
theory and how does it affect the rules concerning subsequent mixing by non-fiduciaries, 
whether innocent or wrongdoers? Third, do they actually go to their logical end point and allow 
unrestricted cherry-picking from very complex sets of transactions? 
Rationalisation of the Subordination Rules as Evidential 
Lionel Smith argues that the principle of subordination Re Hallett is an expression of is an 
evidential presumption against a wrongdoer.49 That necessarily requires rejection of the 
restriction of the remedy to a lien. The familiar example of the stolen bag of coins mixed with 
the thief’s own coins is helpful. If the thief dissipates some coins, the claimant can insist those 
remaining include hers. The evidential gap is overcome by presuming against the wrongdoer. 
This may be a rule with a normative basis, but rules of evidence – such as who bears the burden 
of proof – do carry norms and this just takes that a little further. No recourse to the fiduciary 
obligation is required. 
In the simple example of the bag of coins, it is natural to say that one may presume against 
the wrongdoer and take either what is left or what was removed to be the claimant’s property. 
However, when the withdrawals become more complex, the analysis fits less well. Consider a 
more complex example. Suppose the recipient mixes £5,000 of trust money with £5,000 of her 
money, and then invests £2,000, dissipates £2,000, dissipates another £2,000, invests £2,000 
and finally dissipates £2,000 in that order. On the “good man reasoning”, even as attenuated 
by Re Hallett, it follows as a matter of logic that the beneficiary can cherry-pick and trace into 
all the non-dissipated funds. There are three particular difficulties in rationalising this as an 
evidential presumption. 
First, its precision and granularity is not found in ordinary evidential presumptions. The 
presumption in Armory v Delamirie was that the missing jewel should be valued as the finest 
jewel that would fit the socket because the converter had refused to produce the actual jewel 
taken from it.50 In the law of succession, if a testator incurs a debt and then leaves a legacy at 
least as beneficial as that debt to his creditor, it is presumed that that legacy is in satisfaction 
of that debt so that the creditor does not take its value twice. These presumptions are simple. 
They do not have the granularity of the cherry-picking approach which can pluck the very best 
outputs from, theoretically, a huge number of transactions. 
Second, the presumptions are irrebuttable. The exchanger cannot adduce evidence to show 
she did not use trust money in a particular transaction. This is unlike the usual presumptions of 
evidence where the defendant may undo the evidential difficulty he created; in Armory the 
defendant was free to produce the actual jewel to displace the presumption applied against him. 
Likewise, in Lupton v White the defendant could have proved which parts of a physical mixture 
                                                 
49 The Law of Tracing, p.77–80, 199 (particularly p 80). 
50 (1722) 1 Str. 505; 93 E.R. 664. 
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belonged to him to avoid the presumption.51 As Lionel Smith says, “evidentiary difficulties are 
resolved against wrongdoers who created them, but this principle does not allow findings 
contrary to the evidence.”52 This means the presumptions cannot truly be evidential. They are 
rules of law. 
Third, none of the usual evidential presumptions respond to the election of the claimant. 
Here, the claimant may simply demand, at her whim, which parts of a mixture belong to her in 
equity. This, it is submitted, goes far beyond what evidence-based rules can do. This is a rule 
of subordination, but it is subordination in line with the good man theory. This is where its 
utility remains. 
The evidential presumption rationalisation looks extremely shaky, if not impossible, when 
compared with the fiduciary obligation. The trustee is presumed to act in furtherance of the 
trust and not against it. This better explains the claimant’s power to elect to take away his 
profits. If his intention is consistent with the trust or the beneficiary’s wishes, it is accepted, as 
in the backwards tracing cases. If not, it is disregarded, as in the mixing cases. To call this near-
total subordination evidential simply wraps fiduciary law in an artificial rule of evidence. And 
if that rule of evidence is actually more in line with the fiduciary obligation than normal rules 
of evidence, we should accept that it is the fiduciary obligation. 
Moreover, adopting this rationalisation would be to treat fiduciaries the same as non-
fiduciaries. This is contrary to a long line of dicta insisting that they are held to higher standards 
and that the law will press hard against them if they do not.53 
There is also concern over the severity of the remedy. The authors of Lewin on Trusts have 
“reservations” as to whether the principle should be carried so far that a beneficiary can claim 
into the most profitable investments possible. They argue that if the remedy is confined to a 
lien, the principle at least is limited from such an extreme outcome.54 Rationalising these rules 
so they fit under a property model of tracing forecloses the possibility of having this flexibility. 
Rationalisation of the Dicta as supporting a Property Basis 
Before dealing with that and the other questions left open by Re Hallett, consider Televantos’ 
interpretation of that case. This illustrates the risks in taking the obiter dicta of tracing cases 
and extracting principle or theory from them. 
Televantos’ argument is as follows. Jessel MR’s reasoning reflected a belief that all that 
mattered was beneficial ownership, rather than having a separate equitable title, because tracing 
was an entirely in rem process. Hence the fiduciary relationship in its modern sense, including 
the good man presumptions, subordination rules and the ready creation of equitable property 
for breach of fiduciary duty, did not matter. Instead, so long as one of the fiduciary relationships 
in the older, wider, sense existed, there would be standing in equity and principals (who had 
rights over the legal title) would be able to assert the same remedies as trust beneficiaries.55 
                                                 
51 (1808) 15 Ves. Jun. 432; 33 E.R. 817. 
52 The Law of Tracing, p.81. 
53 E.g. Ex p. Bennett (1805) 10 Ves. Jun. 381 at 396; 32 E.R. 893 at 898; Parker v McKenna (1875) 10 Ch. App. 
96 at 124; Bray v Ford [1896] A.C. 44 at 51; Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] A.C. 134; [1942] 1 All E.R. 
378 at 138. 
54 Lewin, paras.41–079 – 41–080, noting that authority tends towards suggesting cherry-picking is permitted. 
55 A. Televantos, “Losing the Fiduciary Requirement for Equitable Tracing Claims” (2017) 133 L.Q.R. 492, 504. 
See above, discussion to fn.21. 
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This must be addressed because it is in opposition to an obligation model of tracing. It turns 
out that these dicta are also consistent an obligation model of tracing and, given the basis of 
the decision, that is the better interpretation. 
Televantos relies on, inter alia, two sets of dicta of Jessel MR First is his definition of a 
fiduciary relationship: “one in respect of which, if a wrong arise, the same remedy exists against 
the wrongdoer on behalf of the principal as would exist against a trustee on behalf of the cestui 
que trust”.56 Second: 
Has it ever been suggested, until very recently, that there is any distinction between 
an express trustee, or an agent, or a bailee, or a collector of rents, or anybody else in 
a fiduciary position? I have never heard, until quite recently, such a distinction 
suggested … It can have no foundation in principle, because the beneficial ownership 
is the same, wherever the legal ownership may be.57 
On the face of it, these dicta support Televantos’ argument. But they can be read another way. 
At first instance, Fry J had allowed the claim. However, he had to avoid his own reasoning in 
Ex p. Dale, where he refused tracing into a mixture of money on the grounds that old authority 
held that following and tracing money was only possible when kept physically separate from 
other money.58 The justification was that money had no earmark and thus became 
indistinguishable and lost in a mixture. The earmark theory had become obsolete by at least 
the time of Miller v Race (1758)59 and accordingly Ex p. Dale and its reliance on the earmark 
theory was criticised by Jessel MR60 Rather than tackle this head on, Fry J had distinguished 
Ex p. Dale on the grounds that the defendant there was a factor and the defendant in Re Hallett 
was a solicitor. 
Jessel MR’s remarks can be read in this light. Given his heavy reliance on the fiduciary 
obligation to craft liability in Re Hallett, it is submitted that the better explanation of these dicta 
is that Jessel MR was merely criticising the artificial distinction Fry J had cleaved between 
different kinds of fiduciaries. 
Moreover, just because the same remedy arises whether the defendant is a trustee or any 
other kind of fiduciary does not necessarily mean the principles are precisely the same. While 
Televantos is right in emphasising what matters is ultimate beneficial ownership rather than an 
initial separation of legal and equitable title, we achieve that separation in any event. Upon 
breach of fiduciary duty by a non-trustee fiduciary, a constructive trust arises leading to that 
separation, and, because of that, the same remedies then result. Televantos’ claim can be put 
no higher than that these dicta are consistent with both property and obligation models. 
This demonstrates the need for caution sounded earlier. The dicta are inconclusive. 
Moreover, they speak of generalities. One must concentrate instead on the specific rules and 
outcomes and reason back inductively from them. They point to an obligation-based, not 
property-based, model of tracing. 
                                                 
56 A. Televantos, “Losing the Fiduciary Requirement for Equitable Tracing Claims” (2017) 133 L.Q.R. 492, 505. 
57 A. Televantos, “Losing the Fiduciary Requirement for Equitable Tracing Claims” (2017) 133 L.Q.R. 492, 504–
505, Televantos’ emphasis. 
58 (1879) 11 Ch. D. 772. 
59 (1758) 1 Burr. 452; 97 E.R. 398. 
60 Re Hallett (1880) 13 Ch. D. 696 at 713 et seq; see D. Fox, “Bona Fide Purchase and the Currency of Money” 
(1996) 55 C.L.J. 547. 
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Continued Reliance on the Fiduciary Obligation and its Flexibility 
Innocent Volunteers and Non-Fiduciary Wrongdoers 
Now we come to the twentieth and twenty-first century cases, which show the continuing 
reliance on the fiduciary obligation and the increased flexibility it offers. Re Diplock (1948) is 
useful to examine because it shows how the obligation model of tracing was cemented. It also 
left open possible avenues to increase tracing’s flexibility that would be closed off under a 
property model. 
At first instance, Wynn-Parry J thought tracing into mixtures made by innocent donees was 
not possible. He noted Jessel MR’s quotations from Frith v Cartland in Re Hallett and declared 
that “[t]he decision of In re Hallett’s Estate … reeks of trust and fiduciary relationship … it is 
the existence of the fiduciary relationship which enables equity to give that further remedy”.61 
The Court of Appeal reversed him on this point, ostensibly relying on the reasoning that 
originated in Re Hallett: “a declaration of charge … enabled equity to identify money in a 
mixed fund.”62 I.e. there is an initial fiduciary relation; this gives rise to a charge; that charge 
passes with the property into the hands of the recipient; and that charge persists in the mixture. 
Then it does not matter that the mixer is not a fiduciary. This explains the oft-criticised 
requirement for tracing that there must be an initial fiduciary relationship, albeit only for 
mixing and not for other tracing rules.63 
The Court of Appeal thus confirmed Oakley’s rationalisation of how we can follow into the 
hands of innocent volunteers.64 At this point in time, the courts accepted the position I advocate. 
However, the simple situations in Re Diplock can easily be rationalised under a property basis 
of tracing. Simple receipt of equitable property by a volunteer leads to a claim based on title. 
Likewise for mixtures: the ownership of the substitute is proportionate to the ownership of the 
original. This is not a particularly fiduciary rule – it is one based on property norms. 
The difficulties arise, again, when matters that are not easily or desirably characterised as 
ones of property come into play. The first is the proposition that tracing into land would not be 
permitted if it would be inequitable to do so.65 While this can be rationalised as accession and 
thus the destruction of the subject matter of the trust – a principle of property – it can also be 
characterised as a prototype bona fide change of position defence.66 
While it is uncertain, as a matter of law, if this defence applies to a proprietary claim,67 there 
is some justification for it. Since tracing claims are restitutionary proprietary claims, there is 
justification for having restitutionary defences, because one is not really claiming on the basis 
of title.68 One claims on the basis of the obligations the defendant owes, where those obligations 
could take into account the justice of barring a claim where the defendant has, in good faith, 
                                                 
61 [1947] Ch. 716 at 754, 750. 
62 [1948] 1 Ch. 465 at 520. 
63 See further R. A. Pearce, “A Tracing Paper” (1976) 40 Conv. (N.S.) 277, 288; A. J. Oakley, “The Prerequisites 
of an Equitable Tracing Claim” (1975) 28 C.L.P. 64, 82; R. H. Maudsley, “Proprietary Remedies for the Recovery 
of Money” (1959) 75 L.Q.R. 234, 252. 
64 Re Diplock [1948] 1 Ch. 465 at 530. 
65 [1948] 1 Ch. 465 at 546. 
66 It was suggested in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 A.C. 548 at 581 that this defence could be adopted 
in tracing. 
67 W. Swadling, “Policy Arguments for Proprietary Restitution” (2008) 28 L.S. 506, 514 et seq. 
68 C. Rotherham, “Tracing Misconceptions in Foskett v McKeown” [2003] R.L.R. 57, 74. 
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changed her position on account of the receipt. A property basis of tracing, characterising the 
claim as based in a pre-existing property right, would foreclose this possibility. 
The second difficulty concerns one of the questions posited earlier: how one might extend 
the presumptions in Re Hallett and Re Oatway to non-fiduciaries who are at fault. Whether 
they apply in this situation is not clear; the literature is inconsistent69 and there is little case 
law. Millett J held they did in El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings (No.1).70 He adopted the Diplock 
analysis: the notional charge survives the substitution and operates to fix upon the mixture the 
non-fiduciary recipient makes, meaning the claimant can trace. 
There are two problems with this. The first is that for an innocent mixer the charge ranks 
pari passu71 and for wrongdoers it takes priority. If it is a transmitted form of the initial charge, 
created by the initial fiduciary relation, it is strange that it is affected by the fault of the mixer, 
particularly a non-fiduciary mixer, at a later stage. It is less artificial to say that the recipient is 
a constructive trustee and the relevant obligations in constructive trusteeship create this remedy 
de novo. Under a property model of tracing, one might try to rationalise this, again, as an 
evidential presumption, but the same criticisms as before would apply, particularly that it is 
rather closer to the substantive obligations than any rule of evidence. 
The second is that it is inconsistent with Lord Millett’s later abrogation of the rule limiting 
the claimant to a lien if tracing through mixtures in Foskett v McKeown (because that rule has 
its roots in the notional charge theory).72 It is doubtful whether this analysis is consistent with 
Foskett and this makes El Ajou inconclusive on this matter. Therefore, it is submitted, the better 
analysis is the simple constructive trust one, where a recipient with notice is affected by an 
attenuated fiduciary duty, which is firmly rooted in obligation. 
Transactional Links against the Evidence 
The first leading tracing case of the twenty-first century was Foskett v McKeown. It is 
significant because, ostensibly, the majority speeches applied the property-based justifications 
of tracing and advanced the separation claim: “Tracing is … neither a claim nor a remedy … 
Tracing is also distinct from claiming.”73 Lord Millett’s reasoning, however, sits uneasily with 
this. His leading speech reveals reliance on the fiduciary obligation that cannot be rationalised 
away as distinct from tracing. 
The facts are complex, but must be set out in some detail order to show this. Foskett began 
as another simple case of a trustee appropriating trust money. The trustee was one Murphy and 
the beneficiaries were investors in a property development. Murphy had previously taken out 
a complex life insurance and investment policy with a death benefit of £1m, which would 
increase once the investment exceeded that value. After paying two of the £10,220 annual 
                                                 
69 On the side of the rule applying to both: J. E. Penner, “The Difficult Doctrinal Basis for the Fiduciary’s 
Proprietary Liability to Account for Bribes” (2012) 18 T. & T. 1000, 1007; C. C. J. Mitchell, P. Mitchell and S. 
Watterson, Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment, 9th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2016), para.7–49 
et seq (hereafter “Goff & Jones”); The Law of Tracing, p.194; Lewin, para.41–068. Cf G. Virgo, The Principles 
of Equity & Trusts, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p.664 who says the rules apply to fiduciary 
mixers; R. Pearce and W. Barr, Pearce & Stevens’ Trusts and Equitable Obligations, 6th edn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), p.975; and Snell, para 30–057, which begins with “other contributor at fault” but 
continues to deal with “the wrongdoing trustee”. 
70 [1993] 3 All E.R. 717 at 735–6. 
71 Re Diplock [1948] 1 Ch. 465 at 524. 
72 [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 131. 
73 [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 128. 
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instalments with his own money, he began using trust money. The final two payments were 
made with the trust money and there was a dispute over the origins of the third. Assume it was 
made with his own money. Murphy committed suicide, triggering the £1m payout, which went 
to his family as innocent donees. 
Lord Millett, who gave the leading and only fully reasoned non-dissenting speech, said that 
the case was “a textbook example of tracing through mixed substitutions.”74 It would have been 
but for the complexity of the policy. If it had been a simple life policy with no investment 
element, three-fifths of the input would have been clean money. The amount attributable to the 
trust would have been £400,000, consistent with the outcome of the case. However, it was not 
so simple on the facts. The policy had a life insurance account and an investment policy 
account. Payments in were allocated to notional “units”. Once the premiums required by the 
life insurance account were satisfied, the units were allocated to the investment side. Had 
subsequent payments not been made, these units would have been reallocated back to the life 
insurance side in order to keep the life cover on foot. Crucially, two payments were more than 
sufficient to keep the life insurance on foot up to the point where Murphy took his own life. So 
even if the last payments had not been made, the life policy would have paid out. This means 
that there was no causal link between the breach of trust and the realisation of the substitute 
property, the £1m, because the trust money went to the notional investment account. 
The first issue was that the claimants wanted to assert proportionate ownership, and thus 
take £400,000. A lien would have limited them to the money put in, only £20,440. Lord Millett 
noted the criticism of the restriction and its origins in Re Hallett and claimed that: 
Any authority that this dictum might otherwise have is weakened by the fact that Sir 
George Jessel MR gave no reason for the existence of any such rule, and none is 
readily apparent.75 
This is difficult to accept. Jessel MR based the rule on his notional charge theory, which clearly 
explains the limitation. Moreover, even if his reasoning is unsatisfactory, the unease seen 
earlier over the extent of cherry-picking remedy shows a good reason to limit the remedy.  
Nonetheless, Lord Millett abrogated the rule and held it was possible to assert ownership and 
thus take pari passu. In doing so he ostensibly severed a major link to the fiduciary obligation 
basis of tracing. He certainly implicitly rejected the notional charge theory. 
The second, more difficult, issue was the absence of a causal link between inputs and output. 
Lord Millett argued that the order of payments did not matter.76 He relied on an 1888 article 
by Williston that gave a reason to do so. Williston’s reason, quoted by Lord Millett, was that: 
[T]he trustee cannot be allowed to make a profit from the use of the trust money, and 
if the property which he wrongfully purchased were held subject only to a lien for the 
amount invested, any appreciation in value would go to the trustee.77 
There are five things to be observed from this. The first is the return of the hitherto declining 
good man theory. The second is that Williston, unsurprisingly, did not consider the issue of 
causation in his article. Third is that that passage could be used just as easily in support of a 
causation requirement because it requires the “use” of trust money. The fourth is that the juristic 
basis of Williston’s proposition is not in tracing, but in the remedy for breach of fiduciary duty 
                                                 
74 [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 126. 
75 [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 131. 
76 [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 138. 
77 S. Williston, “The Right to Follow Trust Property when Confused with other Property” (1888) 2 Harv. L. Rev. 
28, 29; Foskett [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 130–131. 
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which creates new property rights. The fifth, following from the fourth, is that there are leading 
English authorities holding this very thing. Lord Millett did not cite them. They are not obscure: 
Keech v Sandford,78 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver79 and Boardman v Phipps.80 Instead, Lord 
Millett cited the little-known case of Frith v Cartland, which relied on the good man theory 
and the no-profit rule.81 
Putting aside the casuistry in the reasoning, the problem with Foskett is the route used to get 
to its decision. The justification of tracing espoused was the mere identification of existing 
property rights; “It is merely the process by which a claimant demonstrates what has happened 
to his property”.82 The reality is, however, that tracing in Foskett was underpinned by the 
fiduciary obligation that creates new property rights upon breach of that obligation, in order to 
overcome the absence of a causal link to the substitute property. 
A mere evidential presumption would not have overcome this problem because 
presumptions are displaced by actual facts, and the actual fact was that trust money was not 
used in the life insurance account. Nor would recourse to the fiduciary’s intention do. Murphy 
certainly intended to use trust money, but ultimately failed to do so. Moreover, this means we 
cannot rationalise Foskett as tracing value because the value did not end up in the substitute 
property – even if one puts aside the issue of the increase. 
There is of course a limit – rather than the claim being over the entire £1m, as Berg argues 
is the logical conclusion of Lord Millett’s argument,83 ownership is reduced proportionately. 
This is a result of the need to take only profit, albeit something of a deemed profit based on an 
intuitive rule of apportionment that matches the proportion of money put in. But despite this 
analogy to that property principle, this case does not truly sever the link between tracing and 
the underlying claim. It strengthens and renews it. 
Furthermore, this is not simply a combination of the different principles of the proprietary 
remedy for breach of fiduciary duty and a wholly property-based law of tracing applied 
syllogistically. They are inextricably linked and interact with and inform each other. An 
unconstrained remedy for breach of fiduciary duty would have allocated all the gain to the 
beneficiaries. A wholly property-based rule of tracing would have allocated none of it to them. 
The obligation rule, namely the restriction of the remedy for breach of the no-profit rule, is 
informed by the property norm that the proportion owned in the output is the proportion owned 
in the input. The tracing rule that permits attribution in the absence of a causal link is informed 
by the no-profit rule that says there must be an account of profits for breach of fiduciary duty. 
They combine, in this case to yield pari passu apportionment. 
Fiduciary Non-Wrongdoers 
Another unsettled part of law concerns the situation where a trustee mixes trust money with 
her own money in an account, but preserves the value of the trust in the account at all times. 
Should the claimant be able to cherry-pick the best transaction and trace into one of the 
withdrawals, or should the claimant be limited to the money in the account? This is essentially 
                                                 
78 (1726) Sel. Cas. Ch. 61; 25 E.R. 223. 
79 [1967] A.C. 134; [1942] 1 All E.R. 378. 
80 [1967] 2 A.C. 46. 
81 Foskett [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 133. 
82 [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 128. 
83 A. Berg, “Permitting a Trustee to Retain a Profit” (2001) 117 L.Q.R. 366. Berg is to be credited with spotting 
this issue. 
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the complex cherry-picking example posited above, but the severity of the remedy is 
heightened because of the lesser wrongdoing. 
The authorities are inconsistent. Re Hallett and its reasoning suggests that cherry-picking 
should be allowed. This conclusion is supported by dicta in Shalson v Russo.84 However, the 
opposite conclusion was reached in Turner v Jacob85 and Re Tilley’s Will Trusts.86 An 
examination of these cases reveal how their reasoning and outcomes are tightly connected to 
fiduciary and trust obligations and the flexibility the obligation-based approach yields. 
In Re Tilley, a trustee made a considerable profit in what was ostensibly her own dealings 
in property, but after she had wrongfully mixed trust money with her own. The ultimate 
beneficiary wished, on an application of Re Hallett, to trace into this as substitute property. 
However, Ungoed-Thomas J found that the trustee was innocent of intentional wrongdoing; 
while she was under a duty to keep her own money separate from the trust’s, that breach of 
trust was as far as it went. She had an ample overdraft facility, and this was sufficient for her 
dealings without relying on the trust money. The withdrawals merely avoided the use of the 
overdraft facility. This reasoning is supported by the remarks about how tracing through an 
overdraft was possible (to an extent) in Durant International;87 if tracing trust money through 
an overdraft is possible, it must also be possible to trace non-trust money through an overdraft. 
Ungoed-Thomas J thus held that since the trust money had been preserved at all times, this was 
as far as the beneficiary could claim. 
Oddly, the easier escape route available at the time was not considered – the beneficiary 
could have been limited to a lien, which could have been discharged through simple payment 
and no increase in value could have been taken. No such escape route existed by the time of 
Turner v Jacob, which came after the abrogation of that restriction in Foskett v McKeown. 
Here, again, the claimant wished to cherry-pick the best withdrawal and trace into a profitable 
investment. Patten J limited him to the value of the trust money in the account. This was 
justified by “the requirement that the trustee will preserve the fund and not utilise it for 
purposes unauthorised by the beneficiary.”88 Since the trust money had been preserved, the 
claim was limited accordingly. 
These cases have been considered by some to be wrong turns and it has been said that the 
claimants should have been allowed to trace further into the profits.89 However, both can be 
rationalised by seeing the breach and mixing as innocent. In Turner v Jacob, no breach of trust 
or fiduciary duty was alleged (indeed, the trust was a resulting trust).90 Thus this case was also 
unlike Re Hallett and Re Oatway where breach was pleaded and proven. Without a greater 
degree of fault, the account of profits remedy is not activated. Here there is no breach of 
fiduciary duty: there has been no use of the trust property to make a profit, so the strict liability 
no-profit rule is not engaged; and there has been no bad faith, which means this fault-based 
                                                 
84 [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch); [2005] Ch. 281 at [141]; Goff & Jones, paras.7–51 – 7–53. 
85 [2006] EWHC 1317 (Ch). 
86 [1967] Ch. 1179. 
87 [2015] UKPC 35; [2016] A.C. 297 at [39]. 
88 [2006] EWHC 1317 (Ch) at [100] relying on Re Oatway [1903] 2 Ch. 356 at 361. 
89 J. Lee and J. Glister, Hanbury and Martin: Modern Equity, 20th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), 
para.26–021; Goff & Jones, para.7–53. 
90 [2006] EWHC 1317 (Ch) at [85]. 
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facet of the duty of loyalty is not engaged either. It is a mere breach of trust, not a breach of 
fiduciary duty, which triggers less severe remedies.91 
Clearly this brings flexibility and assuages some of the concerns the authors of Lewin have. 
Again, one must ask if this is merely the wrong explanation and if this rule should be 
rationalised as an evidential presumption, in which case a property basis of tracing could 
accommodate it. But, since it distinguishes between breach of fiduciary duty and breach of 
trust, it is so close to the fiduciary obligation that it is unreal to call it anything else. It is not a 
case of wrongdoer or innocent. It is a question of what kind of wrongdoing counts – breach of 
trust or breach of fiduciary duty, whether it is fault-based or strict liability, as well as the state 
of mind of the exchanger. Delineated precisely by the underlying claim, it is artificial to 
characterise it as an evidential presumption. 
Conclusion 
Tracing contains competing theories and justifications, many of them inconsistent. But, if one 
cuts through them and examines the operative principles, it becomes apparent that it is both 
ahistoric and false per se to see tracing as the obligation-free expression of a set of property 
law rules. The obligation-based tracing that is the current law does mimic a property model of 
tracing, but that is because it works to attribute a substitution in a transaction as if it were a 
trust transaction and this requires specific property to fix upon. But the converse is impossible: 
a property model of tracing cannot mimic the obligational aspects of tracing – particularly the 
subordination of fiduciary wrongdoers – and attempts to rationalise them as evidential 
presumptions are unconvincing. Thus in the current rules of tracing, there is both obligation 
and property but, while perhaps not obvious at first blush, it is obligation that dominates. 
It is true that the courts could continue to develop tracing so as to purge obligation from it. 
But this would take away much of its flexibility and make it unjust. It would go too easy on 
the worst wrongdoers such as the trustees in Foskett v McKeown and the complex cherry-
picking situation where the breach is intentional, and go too hard on lesser wrongdoers such as 
those in Turner v Jacob and Re Tilley who did not deliberately breach their duties. It would 
take away the ability to develop defences such as bona fide change of position and to 
distinguish between pure proprietary claims and restitutionary proprietary claims, which have 
different justifications and therefore potentially different remedies. Moreover, there are valid 
reasons for having different tracing rules for different claims, which might be more compelling 
than maintaining the doctrinal purity of the separation claim.92 
Regardless of these possibilities, the theoretical consequences of the continuing presence of 
obligation in the present law of tracing are profound. The proposition that the process of tracing 
is wholly separate from the claim is false. 
                                                 
91 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch. 1 at 16: “not every legal claim arising out of a 
relationship with fiduciary incidents will give rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.” 
92 E.g., J. Stevens, “Vindicating the Proprietary Nature of Tracing” [2001] 64 Conv. 94, 100; D. Whayman, 
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